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699 
COMMENTS 
Drilling When the Well Goes Dry: The Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission & the Police Power Exception to 
the Automatic Stay 
Introduction 
The oil and gas industry is, for all intents and purposes, the lifeblood of 
the Oklahoma economy. Everywhere you turn, you see another oil pump. 
Some bob up and down as they draw the “cash crop” of Oklahoma from the 
shale formations thousands of feet below. Others appear lifeless and have 
not moved in years. You see them beside the interstate, next to family 
farms, in the middle of empty fields, and even in and around the state’s 
largest cities. Nearly every facet of life in Oklahoma is in some way 
affected by the oil and gas industry. The energy industry in Oklahoma 
employs the state’s largest workforce—nearly 200,000 people.1 The 
population increase in the state is directly tied to the success of the oil 
industry.
2
 Even the state’s tallest building and focal point of the downtown 
Oklahoma City skyline, the Devon Energy Center, is home to thousands of 
oil and gas industry employees.
3
 Furthermore, the price of a barrel of oil 
drastically affects the state’s gross domestic product,4 funding for 
education,
5
 and even charitable giving.
6
 
Given the importance of oil and natural gas to the state, it should come as 
no surprise that the sharp drop in oil prices in 2014 hit Oklahoma’s 
economy particularly hard, especially in the job market.
7
 With the layoffs 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Energy, OKLA. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://stateofsuccess.com/industries/energy 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 2. MARK C. SNEAD & AMY A. JONES, STATE CHAMBER OF OKLA. RESEARCH FOUND., 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY ON OKLAHOMA 48 (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.okstatechamber.com/files/OK%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Tax%20Policy%2020
16%20Final.pdf. 
 3. DEVON ENERGY CENTER, http://devonenergycenter.net (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
 4. See SNEAD & JONES, supra note 2, at 3. 
 5. Luc Cohen & Joshua Schneyer, Taxing Lessons: When the Oil Boom Went Bust, 
Oklahoma Protected Drillers and Squeezed Schools, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (May 17, 2016, 
1:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-oklahoma-bust. 
 6. Steve Lackmeyer & Adam Wilmoth, Oklahoma City Shares Pain Being Felt as 
Spending Cuts and Layoffs Continue at Chesapeake Energy, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 
12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5450268. 
 7. See Associated Press, Low Oil Prices Force 2 Oklahoma Companies to Cut Jobs, 
FUEL FIX (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/03/27/low-oil-prices-force-2-
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came the inability of oil companies across North America to pay off their 
many creditors: since the beginning of 2015, 134 exploration and 
production (E&P) companies in North America filed for bankruptcy, with 
approximately $79.8 billion in cumulative debt.
8
 In 2016 alone, seventy 
E&P companies filed bankruptcy with $56.8 billion in cumulative debt.
9
 To 
make matters worse, E&P companies have not borne the hardship alone: 
155 oilfield service companies ($43.6 billion in cumulative debt)
10
 and 
twenty-one midstream companies ($20.3 billion in cumulative debt) have 
also filed for bankruptcy since 2015.
11
 
In addition to the dramatic impact on the state’s economy, bankruptcies 
of E&P companies in Oklahoma could have an interesting effect on the 
                                                                                                                 
oklahoma-companies-to-cut-jobs (Worthington Industries and Samson Resource Co. 
layoffs); Keaton Fox, Another OKC-Based Oil and Gas Company Announces Layoffs, FOX 
25 (Feb. 25, 2016), http://okcfox.com/news/local/another-okc-based-oil-and-gas-company-
announces-layoffs (Kimray, Inc., layoffs); Brian Hardzinski, Layoffs Coming for Oklahoma 
City-Based Devon Energy, KGOU (Jan. 21, 2016), http://kgou.org/post/layoffs-coming-
oklahoma-city-based-devon-energy; Zak Patterson, Chesapeake Energy Lays Off 562 
Oklahoma City Employees Tuesday, KOCO NEWS 5 (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:28 PM), 
http://www.koco.com/article/chesapeake-energy-lays-off-562-oklahoma-city-employees-
tuesday/4306186; Rod Walton, Oil Bust Hits Home: Apache Corp., Others Cutting Jobs in 
Tulsa Area, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 17, 2015, http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/energy/oil-
bust-hits-home-apache-corp-others-cutting-jobs-in/article_fccc8e3d-99e2-582b-8b35-
09dd99346d15.html; Adam Wilmoth, Energy Company Announces Layoffs in Oklahoma 
City, OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 26, 2014), http://newsok.com/article/5345671 (HighMount 
Exploration and Production LLC layoffs). The economic impact of the energy industry 
layoffs has also affected other Oklahoma industries. Lacie Lowry, Oil Field Cuts, Layoffs 
Trickling Down to Other Industries, NEWS 9 (Oct. 19, 2015 5:45 PM), http://www.news9. 
com/story/30300350/oil-field-cuts-layoffs-trickling-down-to-other-industries. 
 8. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR 2 (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_oil_patc
h_monitor_20171031.ashx [hereinafter OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR]. This number 
reflects only the bankruptcies of E&P companies and does not include midstream companies 
or oilfield service companies. Haynes and Boone updates its Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor 
fairly regularly, and the number of bankrupt E&P companies and their cumulative debt will 
frequently change. 
 9. Id. at 8–9. 
 10. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, OILFIELD SERVICES BANKRUPTCY TRACKER 2 (Oct. 31, 
2017), http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_ 
ofs_bankruptcy_tracker_20171031.ashx. Like the Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor, Haynes 
and Boone frequently updates its Oilfield Services Bankruptcy Tracker.  
 11. HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP, MIDSTREAM REPORT 2 (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www. 
haynesboone.com/~/media/files/energy_bankruptcy_reports/2017/2017_midstream%20repor
t_20171031.ashx. Like the Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor, Haynes and Boone frequently 
updates its Midstream Report. 
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workings of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (“Corporation 
Commission”).12 Specifically, bankruptcy could impact the processes by 
which E&P companies (and even individual working interest owners) 
obtain permission to drill wells in Oklahoma. There are over 3000 oil well 
operators registered with the Corporation Commission.
13
 Of those 
operators, at least thirteen major E&P companies have filed for bankruptcy 
since 2015: Sabine Oil & Gas, Continental Exploration, Samson Resources, 
Osage Exploration and Development, New Source Energy Partners, 
Postrock Energy, Midstates Petroleum, Chaparral Energy, Linn Energy, 
Penn Virginia, Breitburn Operating, SandRidge Energy, and Atlas Resource 
Partners.
14
 The safe haven of bankruptcy offers these debtors protections 
from existing and would-be creditors, chiefly the § 362(a) automatic stay.
15
 
The automatic stay shields a debtor in bankruptcy from the initiation or 
continuation of judicial proceedings brought against the debtor.
16
 There are, 
however, exceptions to the automatic stay.
17
 Among those exceptions is the 
“police power exception.”18 The police power exception allows 
governmental units to exercise their police and regulatory authority—under 
certain circumstances—despite the protection of the automatic stay.19 The 
question becomes: How does this exception to the automatic stay impact 
the conservation proceedings of the Corporation Commission? 
The Corporation Commission recently considered this question as it 
related to Linn Energy, an E&P company based in Houston, Texas, with 
                                                                                                                 
 12. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission is discussed infra Part I.  
 13. See generally OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, OPERATOR’S DIRECTORY (Dec. 15, 2017) (on 
file with the Oklahoma Law Review). 
 14. Compare id. at 29 (Atlas Resources), id. at 70 (Breitburn Operating), id. at 103 
(Chaparral Energy), id. at 126 (Continental Exploration), id. at 318 (Linn Energy), id. at 351 
(Midstates Petroleum), id. at 406 (Penn Virginia), id. at 473 (Sabine Oil & Gas), id. at 476 
(Samson Resources), and id. at 477 (SandRidge Energy), with OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY 
MONITOR, supra note 8, at 7–9. While not listed in the Operator’s Directory, both Postrock 
Energy and Osage Exploration and Development filed their respective bankruptcies in the 
Western District of Oklahoma. OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 8. 
Following its liquidation in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, New Source Energy Partners is no 
longer listed in the Operator’s Directory. Adam Wilmoth, New Source Energy Declares 
Bankruptcy, OKLAHOMAN (March 18, 2016), http://newsok.com/article/5485645. 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
 16. Id. § 362(a)(1). 
 17. See generally id. § 362(b). 
 18. Id. § 362(b)(4). 
 19. Id. 
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operations in Oklahoma.
20
 Mid-Continent II, LLC, a subsidiary of Linn 
Energy, was serving as the operator of wells in two different established 
spacing units when Linn Energy filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
on May 11, 2016.
21
 Less than a month later, Gaedeke Oil & Gas Operating, 
LLC, owner of more than fifty percent of the working interest in each unit, 
asked the Corporation Commission to modify or vacate the pooling orders 
and name Gaedeke the operator of the wells instead of Linn Energy.
22
 At 
the hearing for Gaedeke’s motion on June 27, 2016, the Administrative 
Law Judge raised a concern about the impact of the automatic stay on the 
proceedings.
23
 Gaedeke argued the proceeding should continue despite the 
automatic stay because of the police power exception.
24
 Judge Decker 
agreed,
25
 and the Commissioners upheld the decision, finding that the 
proceeding to re-open the pooling order fell within the police power 
exception.
26
 
Considering the Corporation Commission’s decision that pooling 
proceedings should be excepted from the automatic stay, it is important for 
Oklahoma practitioners to understand how the police power exception and 
the automatic stay function. Part I of this Comment discusses forced 
poolings, the conservation proceeding before the Corporation Commission 
arguably most impacted by the automatic stay and the police power 
exception. Part II explores the purpose and elements of the automatic stay 
and its role as protector of the bankruptcy estate. Part III explores the two 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Restructuring Information, LINN ENERGY, http://www.linnenergy.com/restructuring 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 21. See generally Linn Energy Pooling Order, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD No. 
201506167-T/O (filed May 16, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/Orders/occ5283 
094.pdf. 
 22. Gaedeke’s Motion to Vacate Order No. 652804 and to Reopen Cause, Okla. Corp. 
Comm’n, Cause CD No. 201506167-T/O (filed June 1, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/ 
AP/CaseFiles/occ5285805.pdf.  
 23. Oral Report of the Administrative Law Judge in Response to Motions to Vacate 
Orders and to Reopen Causes, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O & 
201506167-T/O (filed June 27, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/CaseFiles/occ529 
1648.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Oral Appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling in Response to Motions to 
Vacate Orders and to Reopen Causes, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O 
& 201506167-T/O (filed July 22, 2016), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/CaseFiles/ 
occ5297809.pdf. 
 26. Order Granting Motion to Reopen and Order Denying Motion to Vacate Orders 
652804 and 653111, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, Cause CD Nos. 201506166-T/O & 201506167-
T/O (filed Jan. 18, 2017), http://imaging.occeweb.com/AP/Orders/occ5343991.pdf. 
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tests used to determine whether a proceeding meets the police power 
exception in the context of three recent Fifth and Tenth Circuit cases. Part 
IV draws comparisons between groups of cases applying the police power 
exception and forced poolings. These cases come from not only the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, but also the Fifth Circuit because the vast 
majority of E&P bankruptcies have been filed in Texas.
27
 An understanding 
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the automatic stay, and the 
police power exception leads to the logical conclusion that a forced pooling 
should be excepted from the automatic stay. 
I. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission was created by the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
28
 By statute, the Corporation Commission is empowered to 
“establish an Oil and Gas Department under the jurisdiction and supervision 
of the Corporation Commission.”29 The Oil and Gas Department has 
“exclusive jurisdiction, power, and authority”30 over nearly every facet of 
oil and gas operations in Oklahoma, including “the conservation of oil and 
gas,”31 and “the exploration, drilling, development, producing or processing 
for oil and gas on the lease site.”32 
Everything the Oil and Gas Division does for the conservation of oil and 
gas it does in an effort to further public policies: eliminating waste, 
maximizing hydrocarbon recovery, protecting the correlative rights of all 
owners, and preventing pollution.
33
 One way the Corporation Commission 
seeks to further its public policy goals is through forced poolings.
34
 The 
forced pooling statute provides that when working interest owners within an 
established spacing unit have not, will not, or cannot come to an agreement 
about how, where, or whether to drill a well in the unit, the Corporation 
Commission may “require such owners to pool and develop their lands in 
the spacing unit as a unit.”35 Before exploring how the police power 
exception interacts with a forced pooling, it is first necessary to understand 
forced poolings themselves. This section attempts to explain the events 
                                                                                                                 
 27. OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 5. 
 28. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
 29. 17 OKLA. STAT. § 51 (2011). 
 30. Id. § 52.A.1. 
 31. Id. § 52.A.1.a. 
 32. Id. § 52.A.1.c. 
 33. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1 (2016). 
 34. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011). 
 35. Id. 
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leading up to a forced pooling, the policy behind forced poolings, and the 
procedure for obtaining a forced pooling. 
A. Forced Poolings: When? 
Before a working interest owner can apply for a pooling order, the tract 
of land to be developed must be within an established spacing unit.
36
 In 
order to prevent the waste of oil and gas and to protect the correlative rights 
of mineral interest owners, the Corporation Commission has the power to 
establish “well spacing and drilling units . . . covering any common source 
of supply.”37 A spacing order must be issued pursuant to title 52, section 
87.1(a) of the Oklahoma Statutes to create the established spacing unit.
38
 In 
order to create a spacing unit, a “person owning an interest in the minerals” 
or owning “the right to drill a well for oil or gas” within the common source 
of supply can petition the Corporation Commission to create a “unit.”39 
Before the spacing hearing, notice must be given by publication in a 
newspaper in Oklahoma County and by publication in a newspaper in any 
county in which the lands in the petition are situated.
40
 The order 
establishing the spacing unit must include: (1) the outside boundaries of the 
unit; (2) the size, form, and shape of the unit; (3) the drilling pattern; and 
(4) the location of the permitted well.
41
 After a spacing order is entered, 
only one well may be drilled on the unit
42
 and must be drilled in the 
location specified by the Corporation Commission (generally, the center of 
the unit).
43
 
Once a unit is created, any owner of an undivided working interest in the 
unit has the right to drill for, produce, and sell oil and gas drawn from the 
unit.
44
 But the Corporation Commission requires that every working interest 
owner must agree to develop the land before drilling can commence.
45
 
Owners in the unit have the option to “validly pool their interest and 
develop their lands” together.46 With a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)47 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 87.1(a). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. § 87.1(c). 
 42. Id. 
 43. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-24(a) (2016). 
 44. See Charles Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in 
Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. B.J. 648, 648 (1979). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011). 
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entered into by every working interest owner, the designated well operator 
can apply for a “Permit to Drill” with the Conservation Division of the 
Corporation Commission without needing to apply for a pooling order.
48
 A 
pooling order becomes necessary, however, when, for any reason, the 
owners in a unit have not, will not, or cannot enter into a JOA.
49
 
B. Forced Poolings: Why? 
There are several reasons why a Pooling Order may be necessary. First, 
it is possible that the owners in a unit simply do not know who owns each 
working interest in the unit. This could mean the chain of title for one of the 
tracts within the unit stopped, or, perhaps, the other working interest owners 
cannot locate a final working interest owner. It could also be that one of the 
working interest owners, for one reason or another, does not want to drill a 
well in the unit. Finally, there could be a scenario in which every working 
interest owner has agreed to drill a well, but they cannot agree on a 
designated operator or how to drill the well (i.e., horizontally or vertically). 
In any event, without securing the consent of every working interest owner 
(all of whom are necessary to enter into a JOA), none of the working 
interest owners in the unit would be able to drill a well without a Pooling 
Order from the Corporation Commission. 
The most apparent purpose of a forced pooling is to fulfill the 
Corporation Commission’s policy goals: preventing waste, maximizing 
recovery, and protecting correlative rights.
50
 A forced pooling in a 
designated spacing unit prevents waste by ensuring only one well is drilled 
in a unit, thus limiting the number of wells drilled into each formation. 
Without the coordination of spacing and pooling, several working interest 
owners could, theoretically, drill multiple wells into the same formation. 
Such uncoordinated activity can result in repercussions contrary to the 
Corporation Commission’s policy goals, including decreased rates of 
                                                                                                                 
 47. A JOA is the contractual framework for a Joint Venture—when two or more 
working interest owners agree to undertake exploration and production of hydrocarbons. 
Muhammad Waqas, History and Development of JOAs in the Oil and Gas Industry, OIL & 
GAS FIN. J. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-11/issue-10/features/ 
joint-operating-agreements.html. A standard JOA will designate a well-operator, detail the 
scope of the agreement, and allocate the expenses and profits shared by each party. Id. 
Additionally, a JOA will contain standard contract provisions such as sections concerning 
duration, default, dispute resolution, and withdrawal. Id. 
 48. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-1(a)(1) (2016). 
 49. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e). 
 50. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1. 
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recovery, production in excess of pipeline transport capacity, and, possibly, 
pollution.
51
  
Forced poolings maximize recovery by ensuring any willing working 
interest owner in an established spacing unit has the ability to drill a well 
over the protests of any “holdout” working interest owners.52 Without the 
forced pooling mechanism, a single, non-consenting working interest owner 
could completely thwart any (and every) attempt to drill within a designated 
spacing unit. The Corporation Commission prefers not to limit the recovery 
of hydrocarbons based on a single party’s misgivings, and forced poolings 
prevent that very issue. Forced poolings create an easier avenue for a 
working interest owner to drill in a spacing unit without a JOA. More 
drilling inherently means more hydrocarbon recovery.  
While a forced pooling clearly benefits working interest owners who 
want to drill, a forced pooling also seeks to protect the correlative rights of 
all working interest owners in a spacing unit, including those opposed to 
drilling within the unit. The non-consenting working interest owner is 
offered a choice: he can participate in the drilling efforts, sharing his 
proportionate costs and keeping his share of the profits; or he can receive a 
“bonus,” foregoing his right to participate in drilling the well.53 By giving 
up his right to financial participation in the cost (and risk) of the intended 
well, the non-participating owner surrenders his working interest but retains 
his one-eighth royalty interest in the mineral estate.
54
 The bonus given to a 
non-participating owner is usually cash, an excess royalty interest, or some 
combination thereof, although the excess royalty interest is most common.
55
 
The value of the bonus is supposed to equal the value of an oil and gas lease 
had the parties entered into the lease voluntarily.
56
 A forced pooling 
accounts for every working interest owner, making sure each non-
                                                                                                                 
 51. Oklahoma Corporation Commission History, OKLA. CORP. COMMISSION, 
http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/commissionhist.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2017). In fact, 
this very issue led to the regulation of oil and gas by the Corporation Commission in the first 
place. Id. 
 52. There are, of course, necessary procedural steps a prospective well operator must 
take before he can pool his fellow working interest owners. One such step is a hearing where 
his fellow co-tenants can object to the forced pooling. These procedures are discussed infra 
Section I.C. 
 53. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 649. 
 54. Id. Oklahoma statutorily defines a mineral estate as comprised of seven-eighths 
working interest and one-eighth royalty interest. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e). 
 55. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 650–51. 
 56. Id. at 650. 
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participating or non-consenting owner receives his fair share, and protects 
the correlative rights of the working interest owners. 
C. Forced Poolings: How? 
The Corporation Commission has extensive rules and procedures that a 
would-be well operator must follow to obtain a pooling order.
57
 To begin a 
pooling proceeding, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rules of 
Practice require a detailed application to the Corporation Commission.
58
 
The application must identify each of the parties (the applicant and each 
working interest owner), set forth the facts (location of the unit, projected 
cost of the well, and others), provide the legal authority for the application 
(title 52, section 87.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes), and state the relief sought 
(a pooling order).
59
 The applicant must also present a notice of hearing to 
be served with the application detailing the time, date, and place of the 
hearing, the nature of the hearing, the formations affected by the potential 
pooling, and the applicant’s contact information.60 Additionally, the notice 
must be published at least fifteen days before the hearing in a newspaper in 
Oklahoma County and “in each county in which the lands embraced in the 
application are located.”61 
Beyond the general application requirements, a pooling applicant is also 
required to include a statement showing that the applicant “exercised due 
diligence to locate each respondent,” and that the working interest owners 
already attempted to reach an agreement through a JOA.
62
 Furthermore, the 
notice of hearing and application must be served on each working interest 
owner within the drilling and spacing unit no less than fifteen days prior to 
the hearing (although service can be by “restricted mail”).63 Hearings are 
typically held in the courtrooms in the Corporation Commission’s principal 
office in Oklahoma City.
64
 A vast majority of the conservation applications 
(including pooling applications) are uncontested, but a hearing takes place 
nonetheless, albeit quickly.
65
 Any contested case is heard by an 
                                                                                                                 
 57. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission Rules of Practice are codified at OKLA. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 165:5-1-1 to 5-27-14 (2016). 
 58. Id. § 165:5-7-1. 
 59. Id. § 165:5-7-1(d). 
 60. Id. § 165:5-7-1(j), (l). 
 61. Id. § 165:5-7-1(n)(2). 
 62. Id. § 165:5-7-7(a). 
 63. Id. § 165:5-7-7(b). 
 64. Id. § 165:5-13-1(a). 
 65. Nesbitt, supra note 44, at 656. Hearings are governed by OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 
165:5-13-3. 
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Administrative Law Judge who prepares a written report to send to each 
party.
66
 After ten days, the Corporation Commission enters the pooling 
order.
67
 
Given the growing frequency with which oil companies in the region are 
declaring bankruptcy, it is necessary to understand the procedures an E&P 
company must follow to drill a well in Oklahoma. A forced pooling affects 
the rights owned in a mineral estate and even the value of the mineral estate 
itself. As a judicial proceeding affecting a valuable property right that 
would enter the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
68
 
forced poolings provide a lens through which to analyze both the automatic 
stay and the police power exception.  
II. The Automatic Stay 
“The automatic stay bars anyone from taking action to recover a debt 
then owing by the debtor or acting to affect property of the debtor or the 
estate or in the possession of the estate.”69 The stay serves to protect both 
creditors and debtors.
70
 For creditors, the automatic stay ensures that the 
goal of bankruptcy—equal treatment among creditors—is achieved by 
preventing a “chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s assets in a 
variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts.”71 The automatic 
stay, coupled with the jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy court by 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a),
72
 “assures creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not 
racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:5-13-4(a)-(b). 
 67. Id. § 165:5-13-4(c). 
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
 69. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.05[1] (16th ed. 2013). 
 70. Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 71. Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1069 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re 
Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 72. The grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges by a district court is technically at the 
discretion of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012) (granting “original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all cases under [the Bankruptcy Code]”); id. § 157(a) (a “district court may 
[refer] any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under [the 
Bankruptcy Code] . . . to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” (emphasis added)). 
However, most jurisdictions, including every district in Oklahoma, have a standing order 
referring cases under the Bankruptcy Code (Title 11) to the district’s bankruptcy judges. See, 
e.g., E.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 84.1(a)(1); N.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 84.1(a)(1); W.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 
81.4(a)(1). The district court has appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under Title 11. 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012). 
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debtor’s assets.”73 Equally as important, the automatic stay provides a 
debtor immediate and self-executing relief against his creditors.
74
 The 
automatic stay gives the debtor “room to breathe” so he can attempt 
repayment or reorganization without fear of collection efforts or harassment 
by his creditors.
75
 
When an entity files a petition for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 301 
(voluntary petition), § 302 (joint petition), or § 303 (involuntary petition), a 
“bankruptcy estate” is created.76 The estate consists, in part, of the legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property before the commencement of 
the bankruptcy.
77
 The automatic stay generally exists to protect the 
bankruptcy estate for the good of both the debtor and its creditors.
78
 Most 
notably, the automatic stay prevents the commencement or continuation of 
a judicial action against the debtor that could have been brought prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy,
79
 the enforcement of a judgment 
rendered prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy,
80
 and “any act to 
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or 
to exercise control over property of the estate.”81 Accordingly, the 
automatic stay represents an incredibly powerful tool with important 
implications for parties in interest in a bankruptcy. 
To enforce the automatic stay, a court “may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate.”82 Furthermore, a court may—
when the debtor suffers an injury by a willful violation of the stay—order 
recovery of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and (in 
appropriate circumstances) punitive damages.
83
 As soon as a creditor 
becomes aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy (and the resulting automatic 
stay), “any intentional act that results in a violation of the stay is ‘willful,’” 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Dean, 72 F.3d at 755–56. 
 74. Id. at 755. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). 
 77. Id. § 541(a)(1). While the statute lists five other interests that form the bankruptcy 
estate, none are relevant here. Additionally, none of the exceptions listed in subsection (b) 
are relevant.  
 78. See id. §§ 362(a)(1)–(6). Each provision specifically concerns the bankruptcy estate. 
 79. Id. § 362(a)(1). 
 80. Id. § 362(a)(2). 
 81. Id. § 362(a)(3). The automatic stay also contemplates several other potential actions 
by creditors, but subsections (a)(1)–(3) are the most pertinent to the present issue.  
 82. Id. § 105(a). 
 83. Id. § 362(k)(1). 
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and “[n]o specific intent to violate the stay or malice is required.”84 
Furthermore, a debtor in bankruptcy has no obligation to notify his creditors 
of the existence of the stay.
85
 
To avoid a willful or negligent violation of the stay, a creditor should be 
aware of the duration of the automatic stay, governed by 11 U.S.C. § 
362(c). This section, in part, provides that “a stay of an act against property 
of the estate expires when the property is no longer property of the 
estate.”86 The stay can also end when (1) the bankruptcy is closed, (2) the 
bankruptcy is dismissed, or (3) the debtor receives or is denied a 
discharge.
87
 The stay may also be modified, suspended, or terminated by 
the court on request of a creditor or a “party in interest.”88 
The automatic stay is a complex and intricate legal infrastructure. Its 
several interworking parts create a massive web of protections for debtors, 
creditors, and the property of the estate itself. As evidenced by the strict 
rules and sanctions accompanying a violation of the stay,
89
 this two-way 
shield should not be trifled with lightly. Therefore, it is extremely important 
that any party or creditor interacting with a debtor in bankruptcy understand 
the automatic stay, its exceptions, and its reach. 
III. The Tests 
As discussed in Part I, forced poolings are judicial proceedings that seek 
to control property that may fall within the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, 
as discussed in Part II, the continuation or commencement of any such 
judicial proceeding should be automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a). Therefore, absent some exception, a forced pooling would violate 
the protections afforded to a debtor by the automatic stay.  
The “commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit’s police and 
regulatory power” is excepted from the automatic stay.90 This exception is 
                                                                                                                 
 84. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 69, ¶ 362.12[3]. 
 85. Id. ¶ 362.12. 
 86. Id. ¶ 362.06. 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A)–(C). 
 88. Id. § 362(d). 
 89. See id. § 362(k)(1). 
 90. Id. § 362(b)(4). This exception also includes organizations “exercising authority 
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.” Id. This clause is not pertinent to this 
analysis as it relates to the Corporation Commission. Additionally, the enforcement of the 
governmental unit’s power includes “the enforcement of a judgment other than a money 
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termed the “police power exception.”91 The purpose of the police power 
exception is detailed in its legislative history: 
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions 
and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or 
regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a 
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental 
protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of 
such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the 
automatic stay.
92
 
The safety offered by the bankruptcy court is not meant to be “a haven for 
wrongdoers.”93 Thus, this section arises out of the need to continue 
regulatory, police, and criminal actions despite the automatic stay.
94
 The 
exception even goes so far as to allow the enforcement of judgments or 
orders, other than money judgments.
95
 
While the exception “is intended to be given a narrow construction in 
order to permit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public 
health and safety,”96 the exception is not “limited to those situations where 
‘imminent and identifiable harm’ to the public health and safety or ‘urgent 
public necessity’ is shown.”97 So, although the exception itself is “limited,” 
its application indicates the exception is “construed broadly so as not to 
override state laws enacted to protect some public interest.”98 
To determine whether a proceeding falls within the police power 
exception, “courts have applied two ‘related and somewhat overlapping’ 
tests: the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy test.”99 “In order for 
                                                                                                                 
judgment.” Id. Because forced poolings are not “money judgments,” this clause is also 
irrelevant to the present discussion. The Corporation Commission falls under the statutory 
definition of a “governmental unit.” Id. § 101(27). 
 91. In re Halo Wireless, Inc., 684 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Yellow Cab 
Coop. Ass’n, 132 F.3d 591, 598 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 92. In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1182–83 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838).  
 93. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 69, ¶ 362.05[5][a]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 
 96. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d at 1184 n.7 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11089 
(1978))). 
 97. Id. at 1184. 
 98. Id.  
 99. In re Halo Wireless, Inc., 684 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Yellow 
Cab Coop. Ass’n, 132 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1997); Eddleman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 923 
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the police powers exception to apply, an action by the state must satisfy one 
of these tests.”100 
The pecuniary purpose test asks whether the proceeding in question 
seeks primarily to further or protect the government’s pecuniary interest in 
the property of the estate as opposed to promoting public policy.
101
 If the 
purpose of the proceeding is to protect a pecuniary interest, then the 
exception does not apply and the proceeding would be automatically 
stayed.
102
 If, however, the proceeding promotes public policy and welfare, 
then the exception would apply and the proceeding would not be stayed, 
regardless of any purported or real governmental pecuniary interest in any 
property in the estate.
103
 
In addition to the pecuniary purpose test, the Circuits have also applied 
the public policy test, asking whether the governmental unit is “effectuating 
public policy” as opposed to adjudicating private rights.104 If the proceeding 
primarily serves to promote public policy, then the exception applies.
105
 If, 
however, the proceeding primarily seeks to adjudicate or advance the 
private rights of individuals, then the exception does not apply and the 
proceeding in question would be stayed.
106
 Understanding the two tests 
requires exploration of three recent cases applying the police power 
exception in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits: In re Halo Wireless, Inc.,
107
 
Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor,
108
 and In re Yellow Cab 
Cooperative Ass’n.109 
A. In re Halo Wireless, Inc. 
The most recent application of the police power exception by the Fifth 
Circuit occurred in the 2012 case In re Halo Wireless, Inc.
110
 In Halo 
Wireless, various local telephone companies brought actions against a 
debtor corporation before several states’ Public Utility Commissions 
                                                                                                                 
F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1991), overruling recognized by Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 
(10th Cir. 2013). 
 100. In re Pollock, 402 B.R. 534, 536 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 101. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 102. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 103. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 104. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 105. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 106. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588; Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791. 
 107. 684 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 108. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 109. 132 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 110. 684 F.3d 581. 
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(PUCs) to recover fees owed to them under applicable state and agency 
laws governing telecommunications.
111
 The debtor, Halo Wireless, Inc., 
was a small telecommunications company claiming to provide wireless 
phone and data services
112
 pursuant to its license from the Federal 
Communications Commission.
113
 The dispute before the PUCs focused on 
the “type of service Halo actually provide[d], and whether or not Halo . . . 
properly compensate[ed] local companies for the call traffic [Halo] 
transfer[red] to them.”114 Because of the number of suits filed against it 
before the PUCs, Halo filed for bankruptcy.
115
 The various 
telecommunications companies filed motions requesting an exemption from 
the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4).
116
 The bankruptcy court ruled the 
PUC proceedings were excepted; Halo appealed directly to the Fifth 
Circuit.
117
 
Before applying the tests, the court contemplated the meaning of 
“continued by” in the police power exception.118 Halo argued the PUC 
proceedings should not be excepted because the actions were each brought 
by individual, private companies and not the government itself.
119
 Halo 
interpreted the police power exception to require an action be “prosecuted 
by and in the name of a governmental unit.”120 However, the court found 
the statutory language not only excepts the “commencement,” but also the 
“continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit.”121 This, 
the court reasoned, indicated the statute also excepts actions before a 
governmental unit, “without regard to who initially filed the complaint.122  
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 585. 
 112. Halo claimed to provide wireless Commercial Mobile Radio Service defined by § 
332(d)(1) of the Federal Telecommunications Act. Id. at 584. 
 113. Id. at 584-85. 
 114. Id. at 585. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. Although the district court would typically have appellate jurisdiction over the 
action before the bankruptcy court per 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the bankruptcy court certified the 
appeal directly to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 585-86. This decision is permitted by § 
158(d)(2)(A)(i): “[T]he judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which 
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, or involves a matter of public importance.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) 
(2012). 
 118. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 588-89. 
 119. Id. at 588. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 589 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4) (2012)). 
 122. Id. at 592. 
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The Fifth Circuit held the PUC proceedings passed the pecuniary interest 
test because the proceedings did not protect a government pecuniary 
interest in Halo’s bankruptcy estate.123 The court equated a government 
protecting its pecuniary interest to the government seeking access to 
property within the bankruptcy estate.
124
 Because the police power 
exception bars the entry of money judgments against a debtor, the court 
reasoned, the PUCs could not enforce any money judgment against Halo 
without going through the bankruptcy court.
125
 The PUCs, therefore, could 
not gain access to Halo’s property.126 As such, the court held the PUC 
proceedings passed the pecuniary purpose test under the police power 
exception and were not subject to the automatic stay.
127
 
The court also held the PUC proceedings were aimed at effectuating 
public policy and, therefore, satisfied the public policy test.
128
 The court 
reasoned there was an obvious public policy component to the state and 
federal regulation of telecommunications.
129
 The Federal 
Telecommunications Act (FTA) was passed, in part, to prevent 
discrimination in the availability of telecommunications.
130
 The FTA, the 
court found, “contemplate[d] a public purpose to state regulation of 
telecommunications,” and indicated that the “regulation of 
telecommunications carriers serves the public interest.”131 Furthermore, the 
court determined the statutory and common law surrounding PUCs 
“demonstrate[d] their public purpose.”132 Finally, although a proceeding 
adjudicating private rights fails the public policy test, the court remained 
unconcerned that the proceedings were initiated by private companies over 
private contracts.
133
 Thus, the public policy nature of the PUC proceedings 
was strong enough to except those proceedings from the automatic stay.
134
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 593. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 594. 
 126. Id. at 593. 
 127. Id. at 595. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 594. 
 130. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 131. Halo Wireless, 684 F.3d at 594. 
 132. Id. (citing May Dep’t Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 107 S.W.2d 41 
(Mo. 1937); Campaign for a Prosperous Ga. v. Ga. Power Co., 174 329 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. 
App.1985); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 52.001(a) (1997)). 
 133. See id. at 592. 
 134. See id. at 595. 
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B. Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor 
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit addressed the police power exception in 
Eddleman v. United States Department of Labor.
135
 The Eddlemans, owners 
of a mail-hauling business working under contract for the United States 
Postal Service, filed a § 301 petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
136
 The U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) filed an action against the Eddlemans, 
claiming violations of the Service Contract Act (SCA).
137
 The DOL alleged 
the Eddlemans, prior to petitioning for bankruptcy, failed to pay workers 
adequate wages and keep proper records of hours worked and wages 
paid.
138
 Pursuant to the SCA, the DOL filed an administrative enforcement 
action for back wages and inclusion of the Eddlemans on the SCA violator 
list.
139
 Believing the DOL had violated the automatic stay, the Eddlemans 
filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking enforcement 
of the stay against the DOL action.
140
 The Eddlemans also sought damages 
for the alleged willful violation of the automatic stay.
141
 The DOL moved to 
dismiss the adversary proceeding, claiming it was acting within its police 
and regulatory powers in accordance with § 362(b)(4).
142
 The bankruptcy 
court denied the motion, and the district court affirmed the decision.
143
 The 
DOL appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
144
 
The Tenth Circuit concluded the enforcement proceedings passed the 
pecuniary purpose test because the “remedies sought by the DOL [were] 
not designed to advance the government’s pecuniary interest.”145 Seeking 
                                                                                                                 
 135. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991), overruling recognized by Rajala v. Gardner, 709 
F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013). Rajala’s discussion of Eddleman was limited to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the court and did not discuss the Eddleman court’s application of the 
pecuniary purpose and public policy tests. Rajala, 709 F.3d at 1034–35. 
 136. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783. 
 137. Id. The Service Contract Act, codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6707, requires federal 
contractors to pay statutory minimum wages and fringe benefits and maintain certain 
working conditions. 41 U.S.C. § 6703 (2012). A violation of the SCA renders the 
responsible party liable for back pay to the employees, the cancellation of the government 
contract, inclusion on a list of SCA violators, and a three-year prohibition from contracting 
with the government. Id. §§ 6705–6706. 
 138. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783. 
 139. Id.; 41 U.S.C. §§ 6705–6707. 
 140. Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 783. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 791. 
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liquidation of back-pay claims, the court reasoned, would not give the DOL 
access to the Eddlemans’ bankruptcy estate.146 Rather, the primary purpose 
of the DOL’s ability to pursue the statutory damages was to “prevent unfair 
competition in the market by companies who pay substandard wages.”147 
The police power exception, therefore, applied and the action was excepted 
from the automatic stay.
148
 
The court also determined the remedies sought neither advanced nor 
adjudicated private rights and thus, passed the public policy test.
149
 The 
court reasoned that, even though the DOL sought liquidation of back-pay 
claims for individuals, the DOL, in bringing the suit, was not advancing 
private rights.
150
 The court’s opinion was strengthened by the knowledge 
that any of the back-pay claimants would not be able to enforce their money 
judgment absent the normal bankruptcy procedures.
151
 In fact, the claims 
for the individuals, the court held, were an acceptable way to enforce the 
policies of the SCA.
152
 These public policies far outweighed any 
adjudication of private rights, thereby satisfying the public policy test as 
well.
153
  
C. In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n 
In a later decision, the Tenth Circuit again applied the police power 
exception in In re Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n.154 Yellow Cab, a certified 
taxi company in Colorado, filed a § 301 petition for a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.
155
 The bankruptcy court authorized Yellow Cab, in an effort to 
pay Yellow Cab’s creditors, to sell its assets to Taxi Associates, Inc.156 One 
of Yellow Cab’s assets was its Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity (CPCN) authorizing Yellow Cab to operate up to 600 taxis in 
Denver.
157
 Yellow Cab, however, had only operated 300 cabs for several 
years.
158
 Because the sale to Taxi Associates, Inc. involved a CPCN (issued 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 132 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 155. Id. at 593. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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by the Colorado PUC), the bankruptcy court required Yellow Cab to 
request the PUC’s approval of the transfer.159 In its “Transfer Decision,” the 
PUC denied the application for transfer of the full certificate because “the 
unused authority under the CPCN had become dormant” and non-
transferable, citing concerns over competition and public interest.
160
 Yellow 
Cab initiated an adversary proceeding against the PUC to enjoin the PUC 
from blocking the transfer of the full 600-cab authority under the CPCN.
161
 
The bankruptcy court issued the injunction, holding the decision to limit the 
CPCN impermissibly controlled the property of the bankruptcy estate in 
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
162
 The PUC appealed and the district 
court overturned the injunction, citing the police power exception.
163
 
Yellow Cab appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
164
 
The Tenth Circuit held, following a very brief analysis, that the Transfer 
Decision passed the pecuniary purpose test.
165
 The court went no further 
than to say the Transfer Decision effectuated public policy and was, 
therefore, excepted from the stay.
166
 The court did not discuss the PUC’s 
lack of pecuniary interest in denying the full transfer at all, focusing instead 
on the public policy reasons behind the PUC’s Transfer Decision.167 
According to the PUC’s Transfer Decision, “destructive competition” 
would arise out of the unconditional reactivation of the dormant portion of 
the CPCN and “approval of the transfer . . . would likely damage other 
carriers and the public interest.”168 The court held the PUC’s action 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 593-94.  
 162. Id. at 594 (citing Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Yellow Cab Coop. Ass’n, 194 
B.R. 504, 506 (D. Colo. 1996)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. A key issue in the case was whether or not the police power exception applied to 
actions violating 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (acts to obtain possession or exercise control over the 
property of the estate). Id. at 598. This is because the police power exception, as codified in 
1997, was separated into subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) and did not explicitly list subsection 
(a)(3) among the actions possibly excepted. See id. at 596 (dictating the actual language of 
the police power exception as it existed in 1997). The court found that, although subsection 
(a)(3) was not explicitly listed, the police power exception applied to actions stayed under 
subsection (a)(3). Id. at 598. Because the language of subsection (b)(4) now includes 
subsections (a)(1)–(3), (6), this issue is irrelevant to the analysis and application with regard 
to Corporation Commission forced poolings.  
 165. Id. at 597. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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effectuated public policy and excepted that action from the automatic 
stay.
169
 
The court also quickly dispensed with the public policy test, holding the 
Transfer Decision easily passed.
170
 The court used the same analysis for the 
pecuniary purpose test in determining that the Transfer Decision passed the 
public policy test as well.
171
 Notably, the court appeared unconcerned that 
the PUC action decreased the operating certificate from 600 to 300, 
affecting the private rights of both the debtor-seller and the purchaser.
172
 It 
could be argued that the PUC proceeding adjudicated the private rights of 
both Yellow Cab and Taxi Associates, Inc. But, from its brief analysis, it 
appears the court was more concerned with the public interest factors 
behind the Transfer Decision discussed above.
173
 As such, the court 
concluded the Transfer Decision did not primarily serve to adjudicate 
private rights and was excepted from the automatic stay.
174
 
D. Application to Corporation Commission Forced Poolings 
Based on the three aforementioned cases, pooling proceedings before the 
Corporation Commission involving a party in bankruptcy likely pass the 
pecuniary purpose test and will be excepted from the automatic stay. This is 
because neither the state nor the federal government typically has a 
pecuniary interest in the property rights
175
 involved in the forced pooling. 
Much like the PUC proceedings in Halo Wireless, the DOL suit in 
Eddleman, and the PUC proceeding in Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n, 
forced poolings neither give the Corporation Commission access to the 
estate’s property nor further the government’s pecuniary interest. The 
pecuniary purpose test is thus easily dispensed with as it relates to forced 
poolings. 
And, based on the three cases discussed above, forced poolings likely 
pass the public policy test and will be excepted from the stay. A court 
would likely find that the public policy underlying a forced pooling 
outweighs any private rights adjudicated in the process. The goal of a 
forced pooling (and any conservation proceeding) after all, is to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Those property rights being the various rights in privately owned mineral estates, 
that is, a working interest or a royalty interest. 
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waste, protect correlative rights, prevent pollution, and maximize 
hydrocarbon recovery.
176
 The purpose of the proceeding is to promote 
public policy and protect public welfare. This remains true regardless of 
whether or not a working interest owner is involved in a pending 
bankruptcy. 
Halo Wireless provides particularly useful insight in assessing how a 
court would rule on this issue because it involved third parties bringing 
administrative actions against a bankrupt party before a state agency. This 
parallels a working interest owner attempting to pool another working 
interest owner in the same unit despite the latter’s bankrupt status. A strong 
argument can be made that a meaningful difference exists between local 
telephone companies seeking relief from the state PUC for a debtor’s 
violation of agency law and an individual or corporation attempting to drill 
an oil well. A court could decide that the conservation proceedings merely 
adjudicate private rights under the guise of protecting public policy. It 
seems more likely, though, that the furtherance of public policy through the 
Corporation Commission will be seen as more important than the 
adjudication of private rights. 
 A parallel can also be drawn between the limitation of the CPCN in 
Yellow Cab Cooperative Ass’n and the modification of rights in a bankrupt 
party’s mineral estate. The Tenth Circuit was not concerned with the 
limitation on the CPCN because of the public policy behind the limitation. 
This was the case even though the limitation blatantly affected the value of 
the bankruptcy estate in a concrete, measurable way. In contrast, a pooling 
does not (at least in theory) actually affect the value of the mineral estate.
177
 
Unlike the limitation on the CPCN, however, a working interest owner 
subject to a pooling order does not relinquish his rights for nothing in 
return; it is a bargained-for exchange. Therefore, any “effect” on the 
bankruptcy estate is not so much a diminution of its value but rather a 
metamorphosis of the rights owned in a mineral estate. Because the Tenth 
Circuit was not bothered by the diminution of the value of the bankruptcy 
estate through the CPCN limitation, it is difficult to imagine that the court 
would be troubled by a swap of working interest rights for a royalty 
interest. 
                                                                                                                 
 176. 17 OKLA. STAT. § 57 (2011). 
 177. A working interest is arguably more “valuable” than a royalty interest because the 
owner of the latter is more restricted in his rights. A working interest owner has full right, as 
an equal co-tenant, to explore and extract hydrocarbons whereas a royalty interest owner is 
limited to his share of any hydrocarbon sales.  
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The DOL suit in Eddleman bears little resemblance to a forced pooling, 
but an important lesson remains: the DOL filing the lawsuit on behalf of 
individuals did not run afoul of the public policy test. While the DOL 
sought liquidated claims for wages owed (asking the court to adjudicate 
private rights), the public policy allowing the DOL to do so far outweighed 
the private rights adjudicated. Similarly, the Corporation Commission 
would be asked, in a forced pooling, to adjudicate the private rights of the 
applicant, the working interest owner in bankruptcy, and every other 
working interest owner in the unit. The question then becomes whether the 
private rights of the individuals involved in a pooling outweigh the public 
policy underlying forced poolings. 
IV. The Police Power Exception in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits 
Because the three exemplary cases do not provide a sufficiently broad 
spectrum to determine the importance of private rights versus public policy, 
it becomes necessary to explore other Tenth and Fifth Circuit cases 
applying the police power exception. One particularly helpful line of cases 
deals with similar administrative proceedings conducted within the 
government agency itself. A comparison of these cases to forced pooling 
proceedings before the Corporation Commission provides additional 
examples of administrative agencies exercising their police powers while 
seemingly adjudicating private rights. Another informative set of cases 
deals with parties and attorneys (individuals) seeking Rule 11 sanctions 
against debtors. These actions, on their face, appear to be the adjudication 
of private rights and help to further clarify when public policy is adjudged 
to outweigh the private rights adjudicated.  
A. Administrative Proceedings 
Several administrative agencies act in a quasi-judicial capacity when 
they hear disputes between private parties that arise under the agencies’ 
regulatory schemes.
178
 Some administrative proceedings begin just like an 
ordinary lawsuit: an aggrieved party files a complaint with the 
administrative agency against another party, asking the agency to take some 
action against the latter.
179
 While these administrative proceedings seem to 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See, e.g., In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, No. 11-07-10138 MA, 2008 
WL 1733601 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2008); In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. 917 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 179. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *1; Dan Hixson 
Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 919. 
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adjudicate private rights, there are instances where the public policy 
component of the proceeding outweighs any private rights involved.
180
 In 
those cases, the proceedings would be excepted from the automatic stay if 
the defending party enters bankruptcy.
181
 But if the agency is serving solely 
in a quasi-judicial capacity to adjudicate private rights without reference to 
public policy, those proceedings are not excepted and should be stayed.
182
 
In In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of New Mexico considered whether a proceeding against a 
debtor in bankruptcy before the state Human Rights Commission (HRC) 
violated the automatic stay.
183
 One of the debtor’s former employees, 
Hollinger, filed a complaint with the HRC alleging a violation of the state’s 
Human Rights Act.
184
 After settlement negotiations failed, the HRC held a 
proceeding against the debtor, finding in favor of Hollinger and awarding 
her compensatory damages.
185
 The debtor believed the proceeding before 
the HRC violated the automatic stay.
186
 Furthermore, the debtor argued the 
proceeding was not excepted by § 362(b)(4) because the proceeding was 
initiated by a private party and resulted in monetary damages, therefore 
advancing Hollinger’s private rights.187 The court disagreed, even though 
Hollinger was “the direct beneficiary” of the proceeding, because the public 
policy of preventing and deterring discriminatory practices in the workplace 
outweighed the private rights adjudicated.
188
 The court concluded, 
therefore, that the proceeding clearly passed the public policy test and was 
excepted from the automatic stay.
189
 
In In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., Volkswagen of America, Inc. sought 
to terminate its franchise agreement with a franchisee when the franchisee 
entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
190
 To terminate the agreement, Volkswagen 
first notified the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission (“Commission”).191 
Volkswagen sought relief from the automatic stay so the Commission could 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *3; Dan Hixson 
Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 922. 
 181. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *3. 
 182. Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 B.R. at 922. 
 183. Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 2008 WL 1733601 at *1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at *2. 
 188. Id. at *3. 
 189. Id. 
 190. 12 B.R. 917, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 191. Id.  
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rule on whether the franchise agreement should be terminated, arguing that 
the Commission proceeding fell under the police power exception.
192
 The 
bankruptcy judge first examined the nature of the Commission, finding that 
the Texas Motor Vehicle Code and the creation of the Commission itself 
were both proper exercises of the state’s police and regulatory powers.193 
The court next considered whether “every action or proceeding taken by or 
before the [Commission] is ‘to enforce its police or regulatory power,’ 
within the meaning of § 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.”194 The court 
rejected this view, finding the mere creation of an agency or governmental 
entity through the state’s proper exercise of its police powers does not 
inherently mean the agency is always exempted from the automatic stay.
195
 
In fact, the court reasoned that a different construction would render the 
automatic stay meaningless.
196
 
The court determined that whether an agency proceeding will be 
excepted depends on the nature of that agency’s power.197 If the agency acts 
in an executive capacity—exercising its police powers—then that action 
will be excepted.
198
 If, however, the agency acts in a quasi-judicial 
capacity—adjudicating private rights and not effectuating public policy—
that action will not be excepted from the automatic stay.
199
 The court 
concluded that because the hearing affected only the parties involved and 
not the public as a whole, the Commission was acting in a quasi-judicial 
capacity by adjudicating the private rights of Volkswagen and the 
franchisee.
200
 Therefore, the court declined to exempt the Commission 
proceeding from the stay.
201
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 192. Id. at 918–19. 
 193. Id. at 919. 
 194. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). The court quoted the relevant section of the Texas 
Motor Vehicle Code in finding the public policy behind the Commission. Id. at 919. 
Notably, the quoted statute explained that the sale of new motor vehicles “vitally affects the 
general economy of the State and the public interest and welfare of its citizens,” and that the 
“purpose of this Act [is] to exercise the State’s police power.” Id. (citation to the Texas 
Motor Vehicle Code omitted). 
 195. Id. at 920. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 921.  
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B. Rule 11 Sanctions 
A proceeding for Rule 11 sanctions appears to adjudicate the private 
rights of two different parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 lists some 
of an attorney’s duties and responsibilities to the court and to his client.202 
In addition to these responsibilities, Rule 11 provides that a court, either on 
its own volition or on motion from an opposing party, may issue sanctions 
for violating the responsibilities imposed by the rule.
203
 When an opposing 
party files a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, that dispute is seemingly 
between two private parties. However, as the Northern District of 
Oklahoma held in Maritan v. Todd,
204
 the public policy behind an 
adjudication for Rule 11 sanctions outweighs any private rights 
adjudicated.
205
 
In Maritan, a magistrate judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma 
considered whether an appeal arising out of Rule 11 sanctions was 
automatically stayed when the lawyer subject to the sanctions was a debtor 
in bankruptcy.
206
 The party seeking the sanctions (appellant) argued that 
proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions fall under the police power exception 
because of the regulatory purpose of the proceedings.
207
 Citing a Seventh 
Circuit opinion, the court reasoned that Rule 11 sanctions incorporate a 
strong public policy component extending beyond mere fee shifting.
208
 Rule 
11, the court explained, imposes sanctions on lawyers as punishment for 
unprofessional conduct during the course of litigation, not necessarily to 
reduce the costs of the prevailing party.
209
 The court found that parties 
seeking Rule 11 sanctions are “private attorney[s] general,” acting as agents 
of the federal judiciary to punish unprofessional behavior in litigation.
210
 
This, the court decided, was true despite the fact that sanctions could be 
wholly pecuniary.
211
 Even though proceedings for sanctions deal with 
private rights, the purpose “is not an attempt to settle private rights.”212 
Instead, “the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is aimed at effectuating the 
                                                                                                                 
 202. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b). 
 203. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 204. 203 B.R. 740 (N.D. Okla. 1996). 
 205. See id. at 744. 
 206. Id. at 741. 
 207. Id. at 742. 
 208. Id. (quoting Alpern v. Lieb, 11 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 209. Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690). 
 210. Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690). 
 211. Id. (quoting Alpern, 11 F.3d at 690). 
 212. Id. at 744. 
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federal judiciary’s policy of purging needless, harassing, and abusive 
litigation from the federal court system.”213 Because of the overwhelming 
public policy concerns involved, the court held that the proceedings for 
Rule 11 sanctions passed the public policy test and were excepted from the 
automatic stay.
214
 
C. Application to Corporation Commission Forced Poolings 
Analysis of the police power exception as it relates to other 
administrative proceedings and proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions leads to 
the conclusion that forced poolings should be excepted from the automatic 
stay. As In re Aerobox and Maritan show, even proceedings that seemingly 
adjudicate private rights can satisfy the public policy test and be excepted 
from the automatic stay. And, just like in In re Aerobox, even though the 
working interest owner seeking to operate a well by means of a pooling 
order is arguably the direct beneficiary of the pooling, the primary purpose 
behind the pooling order remains the effectuation of public policy. 
Furthermore, even though the private interests involved in a forced pooling 
are entirely pecuniary, like proceedings for Rule 11 sanctions in Maritan, 
the public policy considerations behind pooling orders arguably outweigh 
the private rights adjudicated. 
Despite all this, In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co. gives rise to several 
questions about the true nature of pooling proceedings. Much like the Texas 
Motor Vehicle Code, the statutes detailing the duties and obligations of the 
Corporation Commission set forth strong public policy considerations. As 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas found, however, 
the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission proceedings actually adjudicate 
disputes between private parties to discern each party’s respective rights. 
Similarly, a pooling proceeding is merely an administrative construct that 
modifies the rights of an individual’s mineral estate (transforming a 
working interest to a royalty interest with cash compensation). Furthermore, 
the bankruptcy judge in Dan Hixson Chevrolet determined that, because the 
Texas Motor Vehicle Commission proceeding would only affect the parties 
involved in the proceeding, the agency was acting in a quasi-sovereign 
capacity even though there were strong public policy considerations behind 
the proceeding. This mirrors pooling proceedings, where the only rights 
modified by a pooling order are those of the parties involved in the 
proceeding. 
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Although the concerns arising from Dan Hixson Chevrolet cast some 
doubt on the public policy nature of the pooling proceedings, the balance 
between private rights and public policy tips in favor of the latter. Because 
pooling proceedings effectuate public policy more than they adjudicate 
private rights, pooling proceedings should be excepted from the automatic 
stay. 
V. Conclusions and Recommendation 
Forced poolings implicate the automatic stay and check most, if not all, 
of the boxes necessary to warrant application of the police power exception. 
Primarily, a debtor’s unleased working interest in a mineral estate forms 
part of the bankruptcy estate created by 11 U.S.C. § 541.
215
 Therefore, the 
commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding to obtain 
possession of or exercise control over a debtor’s working interest triggers 
the automatic stay.
216
 A forced pooling is clearly a judicial proceeding that 
seeks to exercise control over a mineral estate’s working interest. 
Accordingly, unless the police power exception applies, pooling 
proceedings must be stayed. 
A forced pooling likely triggers the police power exception, though, and 
exempts the proceedings from the automatic stay. First, a forced pooling is 
clearly a proceeding by a government entity.
217
 Second, there are strong 
public policy concerns associated with not only forced poolings but all 
conservation proceedings before the Corporation Commission.
218
 Third, the 
Corporation Commission holds no pecuniary interest in a forced pooling—
the purpose of the proceeding is merely to allow a willing operator the 
ability to drill a well in an established spacing unit.
219
 Thus, the only 
characteristic of a forced pooling that could prevent the application of the 
police power exception is the nature of the rights adjudicated. 
The pecuniary purpose test presents an easy enough hurdle to clear: the 
state of Oklahoma and the Corporation Commission have no pecuniary 
interest in a debtor working interest owner’s bankruptcy estate. Nothing in a 
forced pooling suggests Oklahoma or the Corporation Commission is 
motivated by a desire to control the bankruptcy estate for its own gain. It is 
                                                                                                                 
 215. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). It is important that the mineral interest be unleased; a 
transferred working interest in gaseous hydrocarbons is not included in the bankruptcy 
estate. Id. § 541(b)(4)(A)(i). 
 216. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (3) (2012). 
 217. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2012). 
 218. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-1 (2016). 
 219. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2011). 
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a safe assumption, therefore, that forced poolings satisfy the pecuniary 
purpose test. 
The public policy test, however, is less clear regarding the fate of forced 
poolings. The stated purpose of the oil and gas division of the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission is to maximize recovery, prevent waste, and 
protect correlative rights; undoubtedly, these are public policy 
considerations.
220
 It cannot be ignored, however, that forced poolings are, 
for all intents and purposes, adjudications of private rights. Any private 
citizen, publicly traded company, or partnership that owns a working 
interest in a mineral estate retains the ability and the right to petition the 
Corporation Commission to let them drill and operate a well within their 
unit. Yes, drilling the well maximizes recovery. Yes, it is unfair to allow the 
inability to reach a private agreement or a holdout working interest owner 
to chill the recovery of hydrocarbons. But do those public policy interests 
outweigh the highly individualized nature of these conservation 
proceedings? Forced poolings unquestionably involve the adjudication of 
private rights. The question, then, is which is more important: the public 
policy goals of the forced pooling or the private rights? Given the 
importance of oil and gas exploration to the state of Oklahoma, it is fair to 
presume that most would conclude the public benefits of pooling and 
drilling far outweigh any individual rights adjudicated in the process. 
The cynical answer to this question is that whether forced poolings fall 
under the police power exception may prove inconsequential. While 
bankruptcies for oil and gas producers occur with increasing frequency,
221
 
the relatively short nature of bankruptcies in the oil and gas industry could 
render the question moot time and again. Take, for example, SandRidge. 
SandRidge filed for bankruptcy on May 16, 2016.
222
 A mere twenty weeks 
later, on October 4, 2016, SandRidge emerged from its bankruptcy.
223
 In the 
grand scheme of oil and gas exploration, twenty weeks is no time at all. It is 
possible that a working interest owner in bankruptcy could emerge from 
that bankruptcy fast enough that the Corporation Commission need not 
                                                                                                                 
 220. There is even an environmental protection argument to be made in support of the 
public policy behind forced poolings and the application of the police power exception. 
 221. OIL PATCH BANKRUPTCY MONITOR, supra note 8, at 2. 
 222. In re SandRidge Energy Inc., No. 16-32488 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 16, 2016); Erin 
Ailworth & Stephanie Gleason, SandRidge Energy Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL 
ST. J. (May 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sandridge-energy-files-for-bankruptcy-
protection-1463404621. 
 223. Adam Wilmoth, SandRidge Energy Emerges from Bankruptcy, OKLAHOMAN (Oct. 
4, 2016), http://newsok.com/article/5520992. 
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worry about whether forced poolings must be stayed. It is also possible that 
a working interest owner in bankruptcy, probably an individual, would not 
object to being pooled and would have no reason to ask the Corporation 
Commission to enforce the automatic stay. 
When the debtor is a corporation, it is easier to justify the adjudication of 
private rights with “promoting public policy.” In that sense, the Corporation 
Commission’s conclusions regarding Linn Energy, discussed in the 
Introduction, seem justified. Linn Energy is a sophisticated and complex 
corporate entity with billions of dollars in assets and liabilities. Whether 
one of Linn Energy’s subsidiaries operates a single well in Oklahoma 
seems less like the adjudication of private rights. In Linn Energy’s case, it 
seems far more important that a viable company take over operation of the 
wells in question to maximize recovery and prevent waste. 
Consider, however, how the exception might affect an individual or 
married couple that files a voluntary or joint petition to enter bankruptcy. 
Perhaps Bob and Jane Smith own working interests in various units 
throughout the state. Maybe they even have the financial means and 
contractual savvy to negotiate a JOA with the other working interest owners 
in their units. Maybe they have every intention of holding onto their 
working interests and have a chance of keeping them when they emerge 
from bankruptcy. Even if the Smiths cannot emerge from bankruptcy with 
their working interests intact, the Smiths’ bankruptcy estate is concretely 
affected by changing the working interest into a pure royalty interest. A 
pooling order devalues the Smiths’ bankruptcy estate and prevents the 
Smiths from paying their creditors as much as they could have when they 
still owned their working interest. Thus, pooling proceedings seem much 
more like an adjudication of private rights when they involve individuals 
that own working interests in units. More likely than not, however, the 
Smiths simply do not exist.  
Although this question may continuously be rendered moot, a chance 
exists, given the immeasurable number of working interest owners in the 
state and the number of well operators registered with the Corporation 
Commission, that some individual (as opposed to a corporate) working 
interest owner somewhere could remain in bankruptcy long enough to be a 
party to a forced pooling. Because of this possibility, the Corporation 
Commission should consider how to treat individual working interest 
owners in bankruptcy. Specifically, the Corporation Commission should 
consider whether the public policy component of pooling proceedings 
outweighs the private rights adjudicated when the working interest owner is 
an individual debtor in bankruptcy. The Corporation Commission’s 
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decision that pooling proceedings involving a bankrupt corporate working 
interest owner are exempt from the stay through the police power exception 
makes perfect sense. Perhaps, however, an argument can be made to halt a 
forced pooling when the debtor is an individual. With any luck, a 
sophisticated, individual working interest owner in bankruptcy will choose 
to contest and appeal a pooling order, allowing a court to finally answer this 
question. The court could then thoroughly analyze whether the public 
policy considerations outweigh the private rights of the individual. Until 
such a time, bankrupt beware: your working interest can still be pooled. 
 
Connor R. Bourland 
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